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CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

THE NEW YORK PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT
COMMISSION AND THE DAWN OF A NEW ERA OF
REFORM FOR PROSECUTORS
Clyde Rastetter†

“You have a D.A., he doesn’t talk about when they convict you or how they convict
you, he’s talking about how he’s going to kill you. He don’t give a damn if you’re
innocent. He don’t give a damn if you’re guilty. He’s talking about killing you. . . .
[I]t’s like a bad dream. You want to wake up, but you can’t do it.”
—Exoneree Randall Dale Adams1

† Associate Editor, Cardozo Law Review. J.D. Candidate, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law, June 2020; B.A., summa cum laude, Columbia University, 2015. First and foremost, I am
grateful to the wonderful staff of the Innocence Project and my terrific colleagues from the clinic
who all prompted me to focus on this subject—including my supervising attorney, the inimitable
Seema Saifee. I also want to thank Barry Scheck for focusing my attention on New York’s reforms
and for his inspiration and support, as well as for being the first to cite a work-in-progress version
of this Note in his excellent preface to the latest edition of the Georgetown Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure. I would also like to thank my Note Advisor, Professor Ekow Yankah, for his
discerning feedback and patient encouragement, and all of the editors of Volumes 40 and 41 of the
Cardozo Law Review, whose tireless efforts, including their careful consideration, expert edits, and
generous guidance, made this piece possible. I must also extend infinite gratitude to my family—
my parents, Bill and Cary, and my brother and sister-in-law, Andy and Alexandra—for their
kindness, patience, love, and support. Any mistakes and mischaracterizations are mine and mine
alone.
1 THE THIN BLUE LINE (American Playhouse 1988).
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INTRODUCTION
For many years, a large segment of the Law and Order–watching
American public has assumed that the criminal justice system plays out
in practice the same way it does on TV—fair, honest, and impartial
prosecutors pursuing justice and endeavoring to put the correct
wrongdoers behind bars.2 At the same time, a growing group of
academics and practitioners have pushed back against this prevailing
narrative, pointing to worrying deviations.3 Yet, these critiques have
2 See Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 51, 53–54 (2016); CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, AN EPIDEMIC OF PROSECUTOR
MISCONDUCT
2
(2013),
http://www.prosecutorintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/
EpidemicofProsecutorMisconduct.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3W9-NCLW].
3 See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 56–57; see also Barry Scheck, The Integrity of
Our Convictions: Holding Stakeholders Accountable in an Era of Criminal Justice Reform, 48
GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, v–vii (2019) (discussing prosecutor Ken Anderson, who
purposefully excised exculpatory information from police reports provided to the trial judge for in
camera review in the case of Michael Morton, causing Morton to be wrongfully convicted of his
wife’s murder and imprisoned for twenty-five years before Anderson’s wrongdoing was
uncovered); Thomas P. Sullivan & Maurice Possley, The Chronic Failure to Discipline
Prosecutors for Misconduct: Proposals for Reform, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 881, 885–
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struggled to gain traction in the face of prosecutorial responses that any
such deviations are merely “episodic,” and the lack of systematic data
collection that would lend definitive support to either side.4 However, the
advent of DNA analysis in the late 1980s—which for the first time
provided a scientifically proven way of determining someone’s
involvement in a crime5—ushered in an era of dramatically increasing
numbers of wrongful convictions being uncovered, along with new data
about the factors that cause them.6 While estimates about the true extent
of wrongful convictions vary, recent analyses have approximated that two
to fifteen percent of people convicted of certain crimes are not the true
perpetrators of those crimes.7 Whatever the actual percentage, there is no
longer any doubt that thousands, if not tens of thousands, of innocent
Americans have been wrongfully branded as criminals and convicted of
crimes they did not commit.8
As the pace of exonerations in the DNA era has steadily increased,9
so too has the data accumulated about the role of prosecutorial
misconduct in contributing to these wrongful convictions.10 According to

88, 885 n.8 (2015) (discussing Carmen Marino, an Ohio prosecutor who attributed his success in
obtaining convictions to jurors, whom he bragged were distrustful of defendants that did not testify
in their trials and were therefore “predisposed to find defendants guilty because they trust police
and prosecutors”; so many of Marino’s convictions were later found to have been irrevocably
tainted by his egregious misconduct that a judge who recently ordered a new trial in a case he
prosecuted described Marino as being “infamous in Cuyahoga County for his vindictive,
unprofessional and outrageous misconduct in criminal cases”).
4 See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 56–58; Scheck, supra note 3, at xxv.
5 See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW
TO MAKE IT RIGHT xviii–xxiii (2001).
6 See, e.g., id. at xviii–xxiii, 222–34, 296, 318, 361 (finding prosecutorial misconduct,
including the suppression of favorable evidence, knowing use of false testimony, and coerced
witnesses, to have been a contributing factor in approximately thirty-three of seventy-four of the
DNA exonerations that had occurred thus far).
7 See CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, supra note 2, at 2.
8 See Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xiii–xvi
(2015); CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, ROADMAP FOR PROSECUTOR REFORM 1, 1 (2014),
http://www.prosecutorintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/WhitePaperRoadmapProsecutorReform.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3FD-3CZU].
9 See Exonerations by Year: DNA and Non-DNA, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Oct.
9,
2019),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exoneration-by-Year.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3YKB-SEM4].
10 See United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) (“There is an epidemic of Brady violations abroad in the land.”);
Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2; Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1533, 1539–40 (2010); Jodi Nafzger, Leveling Felony Charges at Prosecutors for
Withholding Evidence, 66 DRAKE L. REV. 307, 329–32 (2018); Sullivan & Possley, supra note 3,
at 883–90; CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, supra note 2; Opinion, Prosecutors Need a
Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/opinion/new-yorkprosecutors-cuomo-district-attorneys-watchdog.html
[https://perma.cc/2DSV-4LXV].
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the National Registry of Exonerations, official misconduct has been a
contributing factor in fifty-four percent of all DNA and non-DNA
exonerations to date.11 Despite this, prosecutors are rarely, if ever,
disciplined when their misconduct is uncovered.12 As a result of the
Prosecutorial misconduct can take many different forms, but it is generally defined by courts as
“any conduct by a prosecutor that violates a defendant’s rights, regardless of whether that conduct
was known or should have been known to be improper by the prosecutor, or whether the prosecutor
intended to violate legal requirements.” INNOCENCE PROJECT, PROSECUTORIAL OVERSIGHT: A
NATIONAL DIALOGUE IN THE WAKE OF CONNICK V. THOMPSON 9 (2016), https://
www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/IP-Prosecutorial-Oversight-Report_
09.pdf [https://perma.cc/MC9L-NJHK]; see also Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System,
2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 402–03 (2006). This Note focuses primarily on prosecutorial misconduct
related to the Supreme Court’s holdings in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its
progeny—such as the suppression or destruction of evidence favorable to an accused—because
studies have identified Brady-related prosecutorial misconduct as a leading cause of wrongful
convictions and a contributing factor in more than one-third of all identified cases of official
misconduct. See Medwed, supra, at 1537–40; Sullivan & Possley, supra note 3, at 920 (citing
Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 482–83, 509–10 (2009));
% of Exonerations by Contributing Factor, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Dec. 23, 2019),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx
[https://perma.cc/T9KR-2WUJ]; see also Official Misconduct, NAT’L REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Official-Misconduct.aspx
[https://perma.cc/V9ZB-9YKV]. The Supreme Court held in Brady that the suppression of
potentially exculpatory evidence by prosecutors “violates [an accused’s] due process [rights] where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith
of the prosecution.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995) (emphasis added) (quoting Brady,
373 U.S. at 87). Evidence is “material” for the purposes of Brady “when there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 75 (2012) (quoting Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469–70
(2009)); see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (“The question is not whether the defendant would more
likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he
received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A ‘reasonable
probability’ of a different result is accordingly shown when the government’s evidentiary
suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” (quoting United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985))). As a result of the Brady line of decisions, prosecutors have an
affirmative, constitutionally mandated duty to, among other obligations, both learn of any evidence
favorable to an accused that is known to those acting on the government’s behalf, such as the police,
and to disclose any favorable evidence to an accused. See, e.g., Kyles, 514 U.S. at 432–40. Given
the “unparalleled access to the evidence in criminal cases” enjoyed by police and—by extension—
prosecutors, as compared to defense lawyers and investigators, the Brady rule has been described
as the “ultimate guarantor of fairness in our criminal justice system.” Kozinski, supra note 8, at
xxxiii.
11 See % of Exonerations by Contributing Factor, supra note 10; see also Official Misconduct,
supra note 10.
12 See, e.g., BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT Preface (2d ed. 1999),
Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2019) (“A prosecutor’s violation of the obligation to disclose
favorable evidence accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other type of malpractice,
but is rarely sanctioned by courts, and almost never by disciplinary bodies.”); Sullivan & Possley,
supra note 3, at 890–95 (“The lack of discipline imposed on prosecutors who violate the code of
professional ethics has been widely observed in legal literature. But despite this well-known

2020]

A NEW ERA OF PROSECUTORIAL REFORM

59

growing recognition of prosecutorial misconduct’s contribution to
wrongful convictions, and the apparent failure of existing disciplinary
systems to curb this misconduct, a number of states have recently adopted
significant reforms aimed at deterring and preventing prosecutorial
wrongdoing.13 Two states in particular have led the way with trailblazing
reforms: North Carolina, which adopted open-file discovery in 2004 and
established an Innocence Inquiry Commission in 2006;14 and New York,
which in 2017 adopted a rule requiring standing Brady orders to be issued
at the outset of all criminal proceedings and in 2018 established the
country’s first commission on prosecutorial conduct.15 Although each of
the reforms adopted by North Carolina and New York are crucial steps
toward preventing wrongful convictions, New York’s reforms went one
step further and implemented specific mechanisms to ameliorate the
conditions that allowed prosecutorial misconduct to occur in the first
place.16 For instance, New York’s Brady order serves an important
educational function for all stakeholders involved in a criminal
proceeding by listing each category of Brady information required to be
disclosed under the relevant case law, thereby helping to ensure that even
prosecutors at offices lacking robust training procedures will, by force of
habit, be educated on exactly what their legal duties are.17 Similarly, New
York’s establishment of a commission on prosecutorial conduct sends the
message loud and clear: should prosecutors deliberately disregard the
legal and ethical duties that Brady orders make them aware of, they can
and will be investigated and potentially removed from office.18 As a
result, New York’s reforms appear poised to provide the kind of
accountability and deterrence necessary to alter the status quo and ensure

problem, the landscape has not shifted. Courts and ethics bodies rarely sanction prosecutors, and
the rare disciplinary measures tend to be mere slaps on the wrist. This trend of inaction is consistent
even in arguably the most egregious cases of prosecutorial misconduct: the suppression of
exculpatory evidence.”).
13 See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment
of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV.
257 (2008); Gerald S. Reamey, The Truth Might Set You Free: How the Michael Morton Act Could
Fundamentally Change Texas Criminal Discovery, or Not, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 893 (2016);
Scheck, supra note 3, at viii–xii, xxv–xxvii; Emmet G. Sullivan, Opinion, How New York Courts
Are Keeping Prosecutors in Line, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 17, 2017, 6:09 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/how-new-york-courts-are-keeping-prosecutors-in-line-1510953911
[https://perma.cc/
YNN4-SPWK]; Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation to Establish Nation’s First Commission on
Prosecutorial Conduct, GOVERNOR ANDREW M. CUOMO (Aug. 20, 2018), https://
www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signs-legislation-establish-nations-firstcommission-prosecutorial-conduct [https://perma.cc/L8U9-Z839].
14 See discussion infra Section II.A.
15 See discussion infra Section II.B.
16 See discussion infra Section II.B.
17 See discussion infra Section II.B.1.
18 See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
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that prosecutors abide by their legal and ethical duties in every case they
prosecute.19
Part I of this Note will provide a brief overview of the history of the
national dialogue regarding prosecutorial misconduct in this country and
a summary of the clamor for greater accountability that has emerged in
the last two decades. It will also look at some of the factors that led to the
current state of affairs. Part II will analyze the reforms adopted by North
Carolina and New York by examining the comparative benefits and
drawbacks of each, focusing on which measures appear most promising
in light of their prospective impact and efficacy thus far. Finally, Part III
will propose that the two reforms recently adopted by New York—the
implementation of standing Brady orders at the outset of all criminal
proceedings and the establishment of a prosecutorial conduct
commission—provide the blueprint for ushering in a new era of
accountability, as each of New York’s reforms creates specific
mechanisms to check prosecutorial overreach. In this way, New York’s
reforms offer a framework for other states to follow in order to bring
transparency and accountability to an area where they have historically
been sorely lacking.
I. BACKGROUND
In an oft-cited speech given to a gathered conference of United
States Attorneys in 1940, then–United States Attorney General and future
Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson declared that “[t]he prosecutor
has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person
in America.”20 Indeed, as Jackson pointed out, the discretionary powers
possessed by prosecutors—such as deciding who to investigate, what
charges to bring, or what pleas to offer—are incredibly broad and their
exercise of these powers can have enormous and far-reaching impacts.21
See infra Part III.
Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Attorney Gen., The Federal Prosecutor, Address Before the Second
Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), in 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3 (1940–1941).
21 See id.; see also Brandon K. Crase, When Doing Justice Isn’t Enough: Reinventing the
Guidelines for Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475, 477 (2007) (“The Supreme
Court has made it abundantly clear that the discretion entrusted to prosecutors is enormously broad.
The discretion afforded to prosecutors extends from the finest detail of the case to the questions of
whether to investigate, grant immunity, or even whether to bring the charges at all. Today’s
prosecutors are constrained only by imprecise ethical guidelines and judicial review for flagrant
violations of their duties.” (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996))); James
Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1524–25 (1981)
(“The core of prosecutors’ power is charging, plea bargaining, and, when it is under the prosecutor’s
control, initiating investigations. Decisions whether and what to charge, and whether and on what
terms to bargain, have been left in prosecutors’ hands with very few limitations.”).
19
20
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Far more so than any decisions made by judges, prosecutors’
discretionary decisions shape our criminal justice system and impact the
lives of those who come into contact with it on a daily basis.22 For the
most part, prosecutors make these decisions behind closed doors and are
accountable only to other prosecutors, rather than to the people directly
affected by their choices.23
The recognition of the immense power prosecutors possess and the
special role they serve in our justice system is encapsulated by the
admonishment in our ethics rules that prosecutors must serve as
“minister[s] of justice” rather than as “advocate[s],” a role that carries
with it “specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded
procedural justice.”24 These rules reflect the understanding that
prosecutors must take great care in exercising their power so as to ensure
22 See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR
5 (2007) (“Prosecutors are the most powerful officials in the criminal justice system. Their routine,
everyday decisions control the direction and outcome of criminal cases and have a greater impact
and more serious consequences than those of any other criminal justice official.”); see also, e.g.,
GERSHMAN, supra note 12, at Preface (2d ed.) (“The prosecutor’s dominance in American criminal
law, well established when this book was first published in 1985, has become even more
entrenched. The last fifteen years are most notable for a vast accretion of power by prosecutors,
increased deference by courts to prosecutorial prerogatives, and a general failure of courts and
disciplinary bodies to impose meaningful sanctions on prosecutors for misconduct.”); Vorenberg,
supra note 21, at 1522 (“[A]s the powers of other criminal justice officials have contracted, those
of prosecutors have expanded. . . . There is a broad and rather casual acceptance of the fact that
prosecutors often exercise greater control over the administration of criminal justice than do other
officials.”).
23 See Vorenberg, supra note 21, at 1522; see also DAVIS, supra note 22, at 5, 15 (“[T]hese
important, sometimes life-and-death decisions . . . are totally discretionary and virtually
unreviewable. Prosecutors make the most important of these discretionary decisions behind closed
doors and answer only to other prosecutors. Even elected prosecutors, who presumably answer to
the electorate, escape accountability, in part because their most important responsibilities—
particularly the charging and plea bargaining decisions—are shielded from public
view. . . . [U]nlike judges, parole boards, and even other entities within the executive branch such
as police, presidents, and governors, [prosecutors] have escaped the kind of scrutiny and
accountability that we demand of public officials in a democratic society.”).
24 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018); see also Berger
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney is the representative not of
an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”); Jackson, supra note 20,
at 6 (“A sensitiveness to fair play and sportsmanship is perhaps the best protection against the abuse
of [prosecutorial] power, and the citizen’s safety lies in the prosecutor who tempers zeal with
human kindness, who seeks truth and not victims, who serves the law and not factional purposes,
and who approaches his task with humility.”); Stay Tuned with Preet: Winning in the Age of Trump
& Twitter (with David Frum), at 1:15:12–33, WNYC RADIO (Jan. 31, 2019), https://bit.ly/
2HOxS26 [https://perma.cc/DRL8-G5KS] (“Justice is not about putting people in prison. Justice is
about doing the right thing, and sometimes that means getting people out of prison; just like it
sometimes means not prosecuting people; just like it sometimes means giving people a second
chance. All those things, depending on the circumstances, are important, vital, and central, to not
only doing justice, but having people have faith that justice is being done.”).
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that they are advancing the public good in all respects rather than their or
anyone else’s personal agenda, a sentiment that Jackson himself
expressed in his speech.25
A.

The DNA Era and a Shifting Status Quo

In the leadup to the DNA era, it was generally assumed that
misconduct committed by prosecutors—whether intentional or
unintentional—was largely aberrational.26 Judges defaulted to giving
prosecutors the benefit of the doubt and operated under the presumption
that prosecutors’ offices could generally be trusted.27 Academics and
practitioners pushed back against this assumption, suggesting that
prosecutorial misconduct was more widespread and systemic than
anomalous.28 Yet, these critiques mostly fell on deaf ears, and little, if
any, attention was paid to them by mainstream governmental or media
institutions.29 Moreover, prosecutors countered these critiques by relying
on the long-prevailing view that reports of misconduct were being blown
out of proportion, and that any misconduct was due to “a few bad apples”
or “a handful of rogue prosecutors.”30
The status quo began to shift in the late 1990s when the Chicago
Tribune and Pittsburgh Post-Gazette ran separate exposés detailing
findings of widespread impropriety on the part of prosecutors across the
country, including instances in which some prosecutors had gone as far

25 See Jackson, supra note 20, at 3–4 (“While the prosecutor at his best is one of the most
beneficent forces in our society, when he acts from malice or other base motives, he is one of the
worst. . . . Your positions [as United States Attorneys] are of such independence and importance
that while you are being diligent, strict, and vigorous in law enforcement you can also afford to be
just. Although the government technically loses its case, it has really won if justice has been
done.”).
26 See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 52–53.
27 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“[I]n the absence of clear
evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they [prosecutors] have properly discharged their
official duties.” (quoting United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926)));
see also Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 54–56.
28 See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 56–58.
29 See id.
30 Bennett L. Gershman, New Commission to Regulate Prosecutorial Misconduct,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 20, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/bennett-l-gershman/newcommission-to-prosecutorial-misconduct_b_5353570.html
[https://perma.cc/MX7Q-ZLHA].
Prosecutors also argued that prosecutorial misconduct should be narrowly defined as only
intentional wrongdoing, rather than also encompassing negligently or inadvertently caused
wrongdoing, despite the fact that courts do not distinguish between intentional and inadvertent
misconduct when analyzing the misconduct’s legal impact on the integrity of a conviction. See
Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 58–60; see also supra note 10.
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as intentionally hiding exculpatory evidence in very serious cases.31 Even
more troubling was the Chicago Tribune’s conclusion that prosecutors
who engaged in serious misconduct expected to go unpunished.32
Although the public concern aroused by these reports did not last long,33
the Duke Lacrosse Scandal less than a decade later thrust the issue back
into the national spotlight in a frenzied manner.34 In that case, which was
highly publicized from start to finish, North Carolina prosecutor Michael
Nifong charged three members of the Duke University lacrosse team with
sexual assault and then made a flurry of ethically dubious media
statements in which he opined in no uncertain terms on the defendants’
guilt.35 Not long after, it was revealed during a hearing on a motion to
compel discovery that Nifong had deliberately instructed a lab director to
omit exculpatory DNA test results from reports provided to the defense—
a bombshell revelation that eventually led to the indictment being
dropped.36 Disciplinary charges were subsequently brought against
Nifong for violating ethical, statutory, and constitutional requirements for
31 See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice
to Win, Part 1: The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 11, 1999), https://
www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/chi-020103trial1-story.html [https://perma.cc/GW3DEN3U] (“With impunity, prosecutors across the country have violated their oaths and the law,
committing the worst kinds of deception in the most serious of cases. They have prosecuted black
men, hiding evidence the real killers were white. They have prosecuted a wife, hiding evidence her
husband committed suicide. They have prosecuted parents, hiding evidence their daughter was
killed by wild dogs. They do it to win. . . . In the first study of its kind, a Chicago Tribune analysis
of thousands of court records, appellate rulings and lawyer disciplinary records from across the
United States has found . . . [that] at least 381 defendants nationally have had a homicide conviction
thrown out because prosecutors concealed evidence suggesting innocence or presented evidence
they knew to be false.”); Bill Moushey, Hiding the Facts Readout; Discovery Violations Have
Made Evidence-Gathering a Shell Game, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Nov. 24, 1998), https://bit.ly/
2S7ie2s (“In its review of 1,500 allegations of prosecutorial misconduct over the past 10 years, the
Post-Gazette found hundreds of examples of discovery violations in which prosecutors
intentionally concealed evidence that might have helped prove a defendant innocent or a witness
against him suspect. But [in] most cases reviewed by the Post-Gazette . . . [p]rosecutors who
violated discovery rules were seldom punished. Many violated discovery rules over and over
again.”); see also Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 60–61; Joy, supra note 10, at 399–400;
CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, supra note 2, at 2.
32 See Armstrong & Possley, supra note 31; see also Sullivan & Possley, supra note 3, at 884–
90 (surveying just a few of the plethora of examples of prosecutors engaging in serious misconduct
and escaping any discipline).
33 An informal poll conducted by the Chicago Tribune after its exposé ran suggested that the
lack of sustained public outrage over prosecutorial misconduct “may be a result of lack of
information about what prosecutors do and how they behave.” Angela J. Davis, The American
Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 465 (2001).
34 See Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A
Fundamental Failure to “Do Justice”, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337 (2007).
35 See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 76; Mosteller, supra note 34, at 1348–52.
36 See Mosteller, supra note 34, at 1363; Aaron Beard, Judge Sends Duke Prosecutor to Jail,
OKLAHOMAN (Sept. 1, 2007, 2:16 AM), https://oklahoman.com/article/3115792/judge-sendsduke-prosecutor-to-jail [https://perma.cc/W44K-V5AC]
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the disclosure of exculpatory evidence.37 The media frenzy continued
throughout Nifong’s disciplinary hearing, which resulted in Nifong being
found guilty of ethical violations and disbarred.38
The intense media scrutiny accompanying the Duke Lacrosse case
and several other high-profile cases following close on its heels thrust a
discussion of prosecutorial misconduct to the forefront of the national
dialogue.39 In addition, the number of DNA exonerations occurring every
year had reached a steady pace by this point,40 with each exoneration
shedding an increasingly bright light on the various factors that lead to
wrongful convictions, including many instances of prosecutorial
misconduct.41 Increasing numbers of commentators published articles
examining these newly uncovered instances of prosecutorial misconduct
and highlighting the lack of accountability they revealed.42 Moreover,

See Mosteller, supra note 13, at 292.
See Duff Wilson, Prosecutor in Duke Case Is Disbarred for Ethics Breaches, N.Y. TIMES
(June 16, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/16/us/16cnd-nifong.html [https://perma.cc/
59BS-C4HW].
39 See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 30. Perhaps the most notable of these subsequent cases was
the prosecution and October 2008 conviction of former long-time U.S. Senator Ted Stevens for
lying on Senate disclosure forms, costing him re-election and shifting the balance of power in the
Senate. See Kozinski, supra note 8, at xxiii–xxiv; Sullivan, supra note 13. Shortly after Stevens’s
conviction, a whistleblower FBI agent revealed that government lawyers had knowingly concealed
numerous pieces of evidence that likely could have resulted in Stevens’s acquittal had they not been
withheld. See Kozinski, supra note 8, at xxiii. Incensed by the government’s insistence that the
concealed evidence was not material to the verdict or relevant to the defense, District Judge Emmet
Sullivan appointed a special prosecutor to investigate the matter. The special prosecutor determined
that Justice Department lawyers had “committed deliberate and ‘systematic’ ethical violations by
withholding critical evidence pointing to Stevens’s innocence.” Sullivan, supra note 13; see also
Kozinski, supra note 8, at xxiv. However, the special prosecutor also found that Judge Sullivan was
powerless to censure the wrongdoers because he had not issued a direct, written order requiring the
prosecution to abide by their constitutional obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence. See
Sullivan, supra note 13. Judge Sullivan was so affected by the entire episode that he has become a
vocal proponent of the need for greater prosecutorial accountability. See Sullivan, supra note 13;
Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan, Enforcing Compliance with Constitutionally Required Disclosures: A
Proposed Rule, 2016 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 138.
40 From 2000 to 2019, the average number of new DNA exonerations each year has held steady
at just above twenty exonerations per year. See Exonerations by Year: DNA and Non-DNA, supra
note 9.
41 See % of Exonerations by Contributing Factor, supra note 10; DNA Exonerations in the
United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-theunited-states [https://perma.cc/HS99-HT5Z]; Exonerations by Year: DNA and Non-DNA, supra
note 9; see also Official Misconduct, supra note 10.
42 See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 959 (2009); Joy, supra note 10, at 399–400, 403; Mosteller, supra note 34, at 1348-52;
Sullivan & Possley, supra note 3; KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, PREVENTABLE
ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997-2009 (2010), https://
digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/ncippubs/2 [https://perma.cc/A7BN-4MKH]; Joaquin Sapien &
Sergio Hernandez, Who Polices Prosecutors Who Abuse Their Authority? Usually Nobody,
37
38
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journalists were shocked to discover that what had happened to Michael
Nifong was the exception, rather than the rule, and that even when
prosecutors committed misconduct sufficiently egregious to overturn a
conviction, those prosecutors were almost never punished.43 Even
commentators at staunchly conservative publications expressed outrage
at the unchecked behavior of prosecutors and urged for national attention
to be focused on the issue.44 Everyone was asking themselves the same
question: why do prosecutors who break the law not get punished?45
B.

Connick v. Thompson and the Myth of the Self-Policing
Prosecutor

The answer to this question is aptly illustrated by the facts of
Connick v. Thompson, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2011.46 In
one of two underlying criminal cases, John Thompson was prosecuted by
the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office (OPDA) for an armed
robbery during which the assailant cut themselves and bled on one of the
PROPUBLICA (Apr. 3, 2013, 5:30 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/who-policesprosecutors-who-abuse-their-authority-usually-nobody [https://perma.cc/4Q88-4AW8]; Editorial,
Rampant Prosecutorial Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/
01/05/opinion/sunday/rampant-prosecutorial-misconduct.html [https://perma.cc/6D2X-XERE].
43 See Brad Heath & Kevin McCoy, Prosecutors’ Conduct Can Tip Justice Scales, USA
TODAY (Sept. 23, 2010, 1:31 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/
2010-09-22-federal-prosecutors-reform_N.htm [https://perma.cc/27KQ-9QLC] (review of federal
prosecutions initiated between 1997–2010, finding 201 instances of misconduct by federal
prosecutors, forty-seven of which led to exonerations, but finding that only one offending
prosecutor faced any type of serious sanction); Sapien & Hernandez, supra note 42 (discussing
review of a decade’s worth of rulings by state and federal courts in New York City where more
than two dozen instances of prosecutorial misconduct sufficiently egregious to lead to overturned
convictions had occurred and finding that only one prosecutor faced any disciplinary action);
Fredric N. Tulsky, Review of more than 700 appeals finds problems throughout the justice system,
MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 31, 2007, 7:48 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2007/01/31/part-onereview-of-more-than-700-appeals-finds-problems-throughout-the-justice-system
[https://
perma.cc/XJ3W-2NPD] (review of five years of records from a single California district uncovered
how “[i]n nearly 100 cases, the prosecution engaged in questionable conduct that bolstered its effort
to win convictions . . . . Some Santa Clara prosecutors withheld evidence that could have helped
defendants, some defied judge’s orders and some mislead juries during closing arguments”).
44 See Kevin D. Williamson, When District Attorneys Attack, NAT’L REV. (May 31, 2015, 8:00
AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/05/criminal-justice-mess-orange-county-kevin-dwilliamson [https://perma.cc/2GVN-9A3W] (discussing the unprecedented decision by a
California judge to disqualify an entire district attorney’s office from a high-profile capital murder
case after revelations that the office had “colluded with the Orange County sheriff’s department to
systematically suppress potentially exculpatory evidence in at least three dozen cases”).
45 See, e.g., Nina Morrison, Opinion, What Happens When Prosecutors Break the Law?, N.Y.
TIMES (June 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/opinion/kurtzrock-suffolk-countyprosecutor.html [https://perma.cc/DBP6-X8K5]; see also supra notes 31–32, 42–44 and
accompanying text.
46 563 U.S. 51 (2011).
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victim’s pant legs.47 A swatch of the victim’s pant leg was removed, and
a test conducted before trial conclusively established that the assailant’s
blood type was B.48 Thompson’s blood type was O.49 However,
prosecutors failed to disclose the existence of the blood swatch or the
blood type test results prior to trial.50 Even worse, Gerry Deegan, the
OPDA prosecutor handling the case, checked the blood swatch out of the
property room on the morning of the first day of trial and the swatch was
never again located.51 As a result, Thompson was convicted of armed
robbery, which was then used to separately convict Thompson of an
unrelated murder.52 Although the murder occurred prior to the armed
robbery, prosecutors deliberately reversed the order of the trials so they
could use the robbery conviction to prevent Thompson from testifying in
his own defense at the murder trial, as well as to increase the likelihood
that he would be sentenced to death.53 While the jury deliberated in the
armed robbery trial, one of the prosecutors even told Thompson in no
uncertain terms what his plan was: “I’m going to fry you. You will die in
the electric chair.”54 The gambit worked, and following the murder trial
in which OPDA prosecutors continued to disregard Brady’s
requirements,55 Thompson was found guilty of first-degree murder and
sentenced to death.56
Fourteen years later, after Thompson had exhausted all of his
appeals, the State of Louisiana scheduled his execution.57 In a last-ditch
effort to save his life, Thompson’s attorneys hired a private investigator,
who miraculously discovered a copy of the exculpatory report on the
results of the blood-typing test conducted prior to Thompson’s robbery
trial.58 The prosecutor, Deegan, had since passed away, but before his
death—and after learning that he was terminally ill—Deegan confessed
to a friend and fellow prosecutor that he had intentionally suppressed the

Id. at 81 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 85.
52 Id. at 83–87.
53 Id. at 82–83, 85–87.
54 Id. at 85 n.7 (citation omitted).
55 During that trial, prosecutors failed to disclose several key pieces of exculpatory evidence to
the defense, including eyewitness statements suggesting the real murderer was Kevin Freeman,
Thompson’s co-defendant and the State’s star witness against him. Id. at 85–87. Given Thompson’s
prior robbery conviction, he was powerless to rebut Freeman’s testimony and point to Freeman as
the real killer without facing blistering impeachment on cross-examination. Id.
56 Id. at 87.
57 See id.
58 Id. at 87–88.
47
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exculpatory blood swatch evidence in Thompson’s robbery case.59 That
friend kept Deegan’s confession to himself for five years until he learned
that the defense had located a copy of the report, at which time he finally
acknowledged Deegan’s admission.60 After this information was
presented to the trial court, it insisted on a full evidentiary hearing—
despite the fact that OPDA had already moved to dismiss the robbery
case—as the court found it could no longer accept the office’s
representations at face value.61 Before formally dismissing the charges,
the trial court admonished the various OPDA assistant district attorneys
sitting in the courtroom: “I hope . . . [you] take to heart the message that
this kind of conduct cannot go on in this Parish if this Criminal Justice
System is going to work.”62
In spite of the court’s reprimand, the job of punishing the errant
prosecutors fell to the very same district attorney’s office to which they
belonged.63 Grand jury proceedings were initiated against the responsible
prosecutors, but they were quickly terminated after a single day, as longtime District Attorney Harry Connick maintained that the lab report was
not Brady material and told the investigating prosecutor that the grand
jury would make his job more difficult.64 The investigating prosecutor
resigned in protest, and no further disciplinary action was taken.65
Thompson subsequently filed a civil action against Connick and
OPDA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging they had violated his
constitutional rights by withholding the blood swatch Brady evidence.66
In their depositions and at trial, Connick and his former top lieutenants
repeatedly misstated Brady’s requirements, demonstrating that—as
pointed out by Thompson’s expert witness—they had no understanding
of their obligations under Brady whatsoever.67 Indeed, Connick admitted
he had stopped paying attention to developments in the law after he was
first elected in 1974.68 OPDA’s culture of flagrant disregard toward
defendants’ constitutional rights under Brady and its progeny has proven
to be so deeply ingrained and pervasive that publicly available
Id. at 87.
Id. at 87–88.
61 Id. at 88.
62 Id. (citation omitted).
63 Id. at 88–89.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 90–91.
67 Id. at 93–97. Thompson’s expert characterized Connick’s supervision regarding Brady as
“the blind leading the blind.” Id. at 97.
68 Id. at 97. Justice Ginsburg highlighted how problematic this was, given that “[d]uring the
relevant time period, there were many significant developments in this Court’s Brady
jurisprudence . . . .[and] the Louisiana Supreme Court issued dozens of opinions discussing Brady.”
Id. at 99 n.16 (citations omitted).
59
60
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information reveals OPDA failed to comply with Brady in no less than
forty-five different cases—at least fourteen of which have resulted in
reversals of convictions by the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the Louisiana Supreme Court.69 Six of
these reversals occurred prior to Thompson’s two trials in 1985.70 In fact,
OPDA has become so infamous for its track record of violating
defendants’ Brady rights that the Louisiana State Court of Appeal, Fourth
Circuit, wrote in a recent decision that it was “not unmindful of the
storied, shameful history of the local prosecuting authorities’
noncompliance with Brady.”71 Despite this, only a single Louisiana
prosecutor—a former OPDA prosecutor—has ever been formally
sanctioned by Louisiana State disciplinary authorities for failing to
comply with Brady.72
1.

Ineffective Existing Systems of Oversight

The facts of Connick illustrate several leading reasons identified by
recent literature that explain why prosecutors who commit misconduct
tend to evade punishment entirely, or, at most, receive sanctions
amounting to a proverbial slap on the wrist.73 First and foremost among
these is the long-standing and recently reaffirmed assumption by courts
that existing oversight systems within the legal profession and district
attorneys’ offices sufficiently ensure that prosecutors act lawfully.74
Indeed, this erroneous assumption was the precise reason why the
69 See Complaint at ¶¶ 119–50, Jones v. Cannizzaro, No. 18-cv-00503 (E.D. La. Jan. 16, 2018),
ECF No. 1, 2018 WL 418159. The following are all cases in which OPDA Brady violations resulted
in reversed convictions: Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73 (2012); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995);
Floyd v. Vannoy, 894 F.3d 143 (5th Cir. 2018); Truvia v. Connick, 577 Fed. Appx. 317, 320 (5th
Cir. 2014); Mahler v. Kaylo, 537 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2008); Monroe v. Blackburn, 607 F.2d 148
(5th Cir. 1979); Davis v. Heyd, 479 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1973); State v. Bright, 875 So. 2d 37 (La.
2004); State v. Knapper, 579 So. 2d 956 (La. 1991); State v. Rosiere, 488 So. 2d 965 (La. 1986);
State v. Perkins, 423 So. 2d 1103 (La. 1982); State v. Curtis, 384 So. 2d 396 (La. 1980); State v.
Falkins, 356 So. 2d 415 (La. 1978); and State v. Carney, 334 So. 2d 415 (La. 1976). The forty-five
publicly available cases in which OPDA failed to comply with Brady are likely just the tip of the
iceberg. See Complaint, supra, at ¶¶ 124–28.
70 See Monroe, 607 F.2d 148; Davis, 479 F.2d 446; Perkins, 423 So. 2d 1103; Curtis, 384 So.
2d 396; Falkins, 356 So. 2d 415; Carney, 334 So. 2d 415.
71 State v. Wells, 191 So. 3d 1127, 1139 (La. Ct. App. 2016).
72 See In re Jordan, 913 So. 2d 775, 784 (La. 2005) (suspending Roger Jordan from the practice
of law for three months but deferring the suspension in its entirety so long as Jordan committed no
further misconduct during the subsequent one-year period); John Simerman, Prosecutor Spared
Discipline in Key Louisiana Supreme Court Decision over Withheld Evidence, ADVOCATE (Oct.
19, 2017, 5:20 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/new_orleans/news/courts/article_371e4f7cb509-11e7-bde9-bb1d88d2a37f.html [https://perma.cc/TEJ9-TVXS].
73 See INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 10, at 11–13; see also supra note 12.
74 See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 64–68 (2011).
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Connick Court reversed Thompson’s jury verdict and held that a district
attorney’s office could not be held constitutionally liable for a single act
of misconduct by an employee, no matter how egregious the misconduct
in question.75
Yet, studies conducted in the years since Connick was decided have
demonstrated that this reasoning is fundamentally flawed.76 For instance,
an investigation into the professional conduct rules and attorney
disciplinary procedures of all fifty states in the wake of Connick found
that state bar authorities rarely subject prosecutors to disciplinary
action.77 The investigation concluded that the states’ procedures, as
currently constituted, did a “poor job of policing prosecutors.”78 A review
of public attorney disciplinary records in California from 1997 to 2009
reached the same conclusion.79 Although there had been at least 707
findings of prosecutorial misconduct during this period,80 including sixtyseven instances of the same prosecutors committing misconduct more
than once,81 the review discovered that only ten of the 4741 disciplinary
actions reported in the California State Bar Journal from 1997 to 2009
involved prosecutors, and only six of those were related to their conduct
in the handling of a criminal case.82 Additionally, several members of the
Innocence Network formed a prosecutorial oversight commission after
Connick to investigate the Supreme Court’s conclusion that existing
oversight systems were sufficient to respond to and prevent prosecutorial
misconduct.83 The commission reviewed the existing literature and
research on prosecutorial misconduct, quantified the prevalence of
misconduct through independent research, and held forums with

See id. at 64–68, 71–72.
See David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v.
Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203 (2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/
1018_hpkwev93.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Z37-7XAV]; Joel B. Rudin, The Supreme Court Assumes
Errant Prosecutors Will Be Disciplined by Their Offices or the Bar: Three Case Studies that Prove
that Assumption Wrong, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 537 (2011); INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 10.
77 See Keenan et al., supra note 76.
78 Id. at 205. In fact, state bar authorities may sometimes actively hinder investigations into
prosecutorial misconduct. Such was the case with Leslie P. Smith, a Virginia lawyer who
reluctantly kept secret “brazen [prosecutorial] misconduct” in the form of “coaching a witness and
hiding it from the defense” for ten years, because he was informed by the Virginia State Bar that
he had no choice, even though the information could—and eventually did—save the life of a man
on death row. Adam Liptak, Lawyer Reveals Secret, Toppling Death Sentence, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
19, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/19/us/19death.html [https://perma.cc/MWY39BTN].
79 See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 42, at 2–4.
80 See id. at 16.
81 See id.
82 See id. at 54.
83 See INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 10, at 7.
75
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stakeholders in six states.84 After summarizing the results of its findings,
the commission concluded that our current systems of prosecutorial
oversight are either “failing or nonexistent.”85
Given the failure of professional conduct rules and attorney
disciplinary procedures to provide a check against prosecutorial
misconduct, the responsibility for punishing a law-breaking prosecutor
often falls solely to the very same district attorney’s office in which the
misconduct occurred, as in Connick.86 Yet, this means that the
investigation and potential indictment of an errant prosecutor must be
carried out by her current or former coworkers and possible friends, thus
creating an inherent conflict of interest.87 Furthermore, the negative
publicity and scrutiny that such an investigation generates for a district
attorney’s office means that any employees tasked with carrying it out
are instinctively disincentivized from fully investigating and punishing
those involved, no matter how noble their motives.88 As a result, it is
likely that many district attorneys conclude, as Connick did, that
thoroughly investigating allegations of prosecutorial misconduct will
make their jobs too difficult to be worth the hassle.89
2.

Culture of Underreporting

Another reason why prosecutors tend to evade punishment for their
misconduct is the culture of underreporting that is pervasive throughout
the nation’s criminal justice system, despite most jurisdictions’ ethical
requirements that instances of attorney misconduct must be reported.90
Indeed, this problem is reflected in the Connick trial court’s willingness
to leave any decisions about disciplinary action to the district attorney’s
office rather than to also report the misconduct to the state disciplinary
authorities that regulate attorney conduct.91 The primary reason for this
culture of underreporting offered by panelists at forums hosted by the
Innocence Network’s prosecutorial oversight commission was fear of
hurting relationships with individuals the panelists worked with on a daily
basis.92 In particular, defense attorneys reported being strongly

See id.
Id. at 20.
86 See id. at 17.
87 See id.
88 See id.
89 See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 88–89 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
90 See Keenan et al., supra note 76, at 221, 244; INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 10, at 14;
RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 42, at 48–51.
91 See Connick, 563 U.S. at 88–89.
92 See INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 10, at 14.
84
85
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disincentivized to report any prosecutorial misconduct for fear of
alienating the same people who exercised unfettered discretion over the
outcomes of their clients’ cases.93 Indeed, defense attorneys find
themselves in a precarious ethical dilemma where reporting misconduct
has the potential to adversely affect every future client they have, but not
reporting it may negatively impact their current client’s case. Faced with
these two distressing outcomes, defense attorneys understandably choose
not to report, in hopes of minimizing the overall harm to all of their
clients.94 Yet, defense attorneys are not alone, as the disincentive to report
misconduct appears to be so strong that even judges in jurisdictions with
statutorily required reporting requirements by and large continue to fail
to do so.95
3.

Fundamental Flaw in the Brady Rule

The final reason illustrated by Connick about why law-breaking
prosecutors are rarely punished springs from an innate fault of the
Supreme Court’s holding in Brady v. Maryland.96 Namely, the Brady rule
makes prosecutors the sole arbiters of what evidence is favorable to an
accused, which in turn creates a fundamental conflict of interest for
prosecutors, no matter how benevolent and well-intentioned they might
be.97 Although the Court routinely reminds district attorneys that “the
prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of
disclosure,”98 even the most righteous prosecutors will at some point find
they must choose between their dual, competing roles as advocates and

See id.
See id.
95 See id.; see also Keenan et al., supra note 76, at 221.
96 See Cynthia E. Jones, Here Comes the Judge: A Model for Judicial Oversight and Regulation
of the Brady Disclosure Duty, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 87, 87–89, 92–109 (2017); Medwed, supra
note 10, at 1539–44; Sullivan & Possley, supra note 3, at 914–20.
97 See Sullivan & Possley, supra note 3, at 915 n.132 (“In the opinion of one of the authors,
based upon his personal experience as both a former U.S. Attorney and as a defense attorney, it is
obvious that even the most honorable prosecutors have a built-in conflict of interest in deciding
what to produce to the defense before trial. This opinion is supported by the myriad cases of
undisclosed exculpatory evidence in the Registry of Exonerations.”); see also Jones, supra note 96,
at 104–06; KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI ET AL., MATERIAL INDIFFERENCE: HOW COURTS ARE
IMPEDING FAIR DISCLOSURE IN CRIMINAL CASES 22 (2014), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/
facpubs/885 [https://perma.cc/HZ2P-XY8M].
98 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976); see also, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
419, 439 (1995) (“[A] prosecutor anxious about tacking too close to the wind will disclose a
favorable piece of evidence.”).
93
94
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ministers of justice.99 Will they, for instance, see that justice is done and
disclose the favorable evidence that might allow a confessed and DNAlinked rapist to walk free, or will they suppress the evidence to ensure
that the rapist is convicted and that they win their case?100 It is an
impossible decision for anyone to make and is one that has far too many
important ramifications to be left in the hands of just one of the
stakeholders in our adversarial criminal justice system.101
Moreover, prosecutors have nothing to lose and everything to gain
by doing precisely the opposite of what the Supreme Court instructs and
erring in favor of suppression rather than disclosure.102 This is partly
because it is simply “not in their hearts to look for ways to help the other
side,”103 but it is also because a prosecutor’s decision to withhold
evidence normally means that the evidence will forever be hidden from
defense lawyers and the courts.104 Indeed, prosecutors are under no
obligation to provide a privilege log to the defense or to inform them
about what evidence they have withheld, nor must they consult with the
court about what they should or should not produce.105 This, combined
with the dearth of repercussions even when misconduct is found to have
occurred, means the Brady rule as currently formulated seems to actually
create “perverse incentives” for prosecutors to engage in, rather than
refrain from, committing misconduct.106

99 See Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U.
L.Q. 713, 727–28 (1999) (“The prosecutor labors under the pull of two divergent forces created by
the ethical precepts. One of these forces requires an attorney to advocate passionately the
government’s position, while the other pushes the prosecutor to seek a result that may not be exactly
what the client and the attorney desire: a conclusion short of a criminal conviction. Therefore, at
the core of a prosecutor’s function lies a potentially irreconcilable conflict between doing justice—
which the ethical codes do not define—and the prosecutor’s role as the government’s primary
advocate in the criminal justice system.”); see also RIDOLFI ET AL., supra note 97, at 22; Jones,
supra note 96, at 104–06; Sullivan & Possley, supra note 3, at 915 n.132.
100 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 96, at 104 (“Although prosecutors believe they have a
responsibility to be ‘just’ and ‘fair,’ they also maintain an equally strong belief that the defendant
is guilty and deserves to be convicted and punished. Prosecutors . . . fear that compliance with
Brady will result in unjust acquittals. . . . [And] that ‘dishonest’ defense attorneys will use the
favorable information to ‘create’ a baseless defense, distort the ‘real’ facts of the case, or otherwise
gain an unfair advantage in the litigation.”).
101 See RIDOLFI ET AL., supra note 97, at 22; Henning, supra note 99, at 727–28; Jones, supra
note 96, at 104–06; Sullivan & Possley, supra note 3, at 915 n.132.
102 See RIDOLFI ET AL., supra note 97, at 22; Jones, supra note 96, at 104–06; Sullivan &
Possley, supra note 3, at 915 n.132.
103 Kozinski, supra note 8, at xxvii.
104 See Medwed, supra note 10, at 1541–42; Sullivan & Possley, supra note 3, at 916.
105 See Sullivan & Possley, supra note 3, at 916.
106 Joy, supra note 10, at 400. Professor Joy further points out that “psychological literature
demonstrates that when one is not held accountable for decisions several biases come into play that
negatively affect the quality of those decisions. Thus, the overall lack of accountability is a
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The problematic nature of this current state of affairs is fittingly
encapsulated in the views expressed by former Orleans Parish District
Attorney Harry Connick when questioned about his office’s history of
Brady violations during the trial in John Thompson’s civil suit.107 For
instance, Connick was asked about the Supreme Court decision Kyles v.
Whitley, in which the Court reversed another capital murder conviction
and death sentence obtained by his office due to its suppression of
exculpatory Brady evidence.108 In so doing, the Court roundly rejected
OPDA’s proposals to loosen the Brady rule to give prosecutors “a certain
amount of leeway in making a judgment call” about the disclosure of any
given piece of evidence,109 as well as to not hold prosecutors accountable
for favorable evidence withheld from them by the police.110 As for
Kyles’s trial, the Court concluded that “‘fairness’ cannot be stretched to
the point of calling this a fair trial.”111 In spite of the Court’s emphatic
rejection in Kyles of OPDA’s proposed changes to the Brady rule,112 and
the office’s long and continuing track record of Brady violations and
related reversed convictions,113 Connick nonetheless told Thompson’s
civil jury that he was satisfied with his office’s practices in the wake of
Kyles, and that the decision had not occasioned any need to change his
office’s practices.114 Indeed, Connick admitted that he had never once
condition contributing to prosecutorial misconduct.” Id. at 427 (citing Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip
E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255 (1999)); see
also Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously,
8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 275, 294 (2004) (“[There is a] human tendency to push margins when there
are no sufficiently demanding external controls . . . . While most prosecutors are honorable, there
are individual prosecutors who will take advantage of any system. The current system offers more
incentive and opportunity for the errant prosecutor.”).
107 See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
108 514 U.S. 419 (1995); see Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 100 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
109 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438–39 (“Unless . . . the adversary system of prosecution is to descend to
a gladiatorial level unmitigated by any prosecutorial obligation for the sake of truth, the government
simply cannot avoid responsibility for knowing when the suppression of evidence has come to
portend such an effect on a trial’s outcome as to destroy confidence in its result.”).
110 Id. at 438 (“[A]ny argument for excusing a prosecutor from disclosing what he does not
happen to know about boils down to a plea to substitute the police for the prosecutor, and even for
the courts themselves, as the final arbiters of the government’s obligation to ensure fair trials.”).
111 Id. at 454. The Court continued: “[C]onfidence that the verdict would have been unaffected
cannot survive when suppressed evidence would have entitled a jury to find that the eyewitnesses
were not consistent in describing the killer, that two out of the four eyewitnesses testifying were
unreliable, that the most damning physical evidence was subject to suspicion, that the investigation
that produced it was insufficiently probing, and that the principal police witness was insufficiently
informed or candid.” Id.
112 See supra notes 109–110 and accompanying text.
113 See Michael Wines, Prosecutors Had the Wrong Man. They Prosecuted Him Anyway., N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/17/us/prosecutors-new-orleansevidence.html. [https://perma.cc/NKQ7-9YYW]; supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text.
114 See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 100 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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fired or even so much as disciplined a single prosecutor for violating
Brady,115 in spite of their long and “storied” track record of doing so.116
Given Connick’s answer to this question about Kyles, one can only
imagine that he would have provided the same response if asked about
changing his office’s practices in the wake of any of the other numerous
decisions in which prosecutors from his office were found to have
violated defendants’ Brady rights.117 Such casual indifference to the
Supreme Court’s constitutional strictures—as also reflected in Connick’s
resistance to holding accountable the prosecutors responsible for
Thompson’s conviction because doing so would make his job more
difficult118—can be explained only by the fact that Connick faced no
consequences for not abiding by the Court’s directives.119
Connick is hardly an aberration in this regard. For example, one
article written in the wake of the Court’s decision in Connick used
evidence gleaned from civil rights lawsuits to examine the disciplinary
practices of three “progressive” New York City district attorney’s’
offices—in the Bronx, Queens, and Brooklyn—each of which had a
history of violating defendants’ Brady rights and convictions
subsequently being overturned.120 Discovery exchanged in the civil cases
and depositions taken of prosecutors from these offices revealed,
however, that the overturned convictions had provided no impetus for the
offices to change their practices.121 Rather, each office continued to lack
any codes of conduct or formal disciplinary rules to deter prosecutors
from violating Brady and other related due process rules that help
guarantee defendants their constitutional right to a fair trial.122 Moreover,
the three district attorney’s’ offices were unable to offer any evidence that
they had a practice of imposing sanctions or other negative consequences
on prosecutors who violated Brady.123 This perhaps helps explain why
there continue to be findings that prosecutors from these offices have
committed misconduct.124 The article thus concluded by urging the
Supreme Court to abandon its “false assumption” that prosecutors are

See id.
See supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text.
117 See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
118 See Connick, 563 U.S. at 100 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
119 See supra text accompanying notes 12, 106.
120 See Rudin, supra note 76, at 544–72.
121 See id. at 548–55, 563–67.
122 See id at 544, 572.
123 See id at 540, 553, 557–58, 566–67.
124 See Sapien & Hernandez, supra note 42; Denis Slattery, Bronx Prosecutor Bashed and
Barred from Courtroom for Misconduct, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 6, 2014, 2:01 AM), http://
www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/bronx-prosecutor-barred-courtroom-article-1.1746238
[https://perma.cc/3RC8-EV4R].
115
116
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actually disciplined by, or have reason to fear being disciplined by, their
offices or state disciplinary authorities.125
The takeaway from the current landscape surrounding the Brady rule
is therefore inescapable—if defendants’ constitutional rights are to be
vindicated in this country, something more is needed.126 As long as sole
discretion and oversight over the exercise of Brady obligations remains
with prosecutors, Brady violations will continue unchecked.127 As
observed by Thomas Sullivan, the former U.S. Attorney for the Northern
District of Illinois, the proof is in the pudding: “the myriad cases of
undisclosed exculpatory evidence in the Registry of Exonerations” are a
clear demonstration that the system is not working.128
II. ANALYSIS: STATE-LEVEL REFORMS
Although there is greater awareness than ever before about the role
of prosecutorial misconduct in causing wrongful convictions, the
literature examining the issue in the years since Connick makes clear that
existing mechanisms meant to police prosecutors have largely been
toothless and ineffective.129 As a result, several states have adopted
reforms that take dramatic steps toward introducing greater
accountability into this area.130 Two states in particular have led the way
with trailblazing reforms: North Carolina, which adopted open-file
discovery in 2004131 and established an Innocence Inquiry Commission
Rudin, supra note 76, at 572.
See Kozinski, supra note 8, at xxvi (“While most prosecutors are fair and honest, a legal
environment that tolerates sharp prosecutorial practices gives important and undeserved career
advantages to prosecutors who are willing to step over the line, tempting others to do the same.
Having strict rules that prosecutors must follow will thus not merely avoid the risk of letting a guilty
man free to commit other crimes while an innocent one languishes his life away, it will also preserve
the integrity of the prosecutorial process by shielding principled prosecutors from unfair
competition from their less principled colleagues.”); see also supra notes 96–97, 99–125 and
accompanying text.
127 See supra notes 96–125 and accompanying text; see also DAVIS, supra note 22, at 15
(“Prosecutors have been left to regulate themselves, and . . . such self-regulation has been either
nonexistent or woefully inadequate.”); Kozinski, supra note 8, at viii (“[W]e have what I have
described elsewhere as an ‘epidemic of Brady violations abroad in the land’ . . . .”).
128 Sullivan & Possley, supra note 3, at 915 n.132.
129 See supra Part I.
130 See, e.g., Mosteller, supra note 13; Reamey, supra note 13; Scheck, supra note 3; Governor
Cuomo Signs Legislation to Establish Nation’s First Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct, supra
note 13; Sullivan, supra note 13.
131 See Open and Shut: North Carolina Strengthens Its Open Discovery Law, EVIDENCEPROF
BLOG (June 3, 2011), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2011/06/back-in-2004north-carolina-governor-mike-easley-signed-a-bill-into-law-that-required-prosecutors-to-sharetheir-files.html [https://perma.cc/YDF2-PAZ8]. Although several other states have since followed
125
126
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in 2006;132 and New York, which in 2017 adopted a rule requiring
standing Brady orders to be issued at the outset of all criminal
proceedings133 and in 2018 established the country’s first commission on
prosecutorial conduct.134 This Section will begin with a brief discussion
of each of these reforms before analyzing which reforms seem to have
the greatest potential for ushering in a new era of accountability and
reform for prosecutors.
A.
1.

North Carolina
Open-File Discovery

Two years prior to the Duke Lacrosse Scandal and Michael Nifong’s
disbarment, North Carolina passed a trailblazing open-file discovery law
that requires district attorneys to open their files to defense attorneys who
request access before trial and fully disclose things like police
investigator notes, witness statements, scientific test results, and lists of
probable trial witnesses.135 Open-file discovery laws like this have grown
increasingly popular as of late, and they generally require complete
disclosure of prosecution files to the defense, without regard to the
materiality of the documents.136 In 2011, North Carolina updated its law
to impose new obligations on investigative agencies to promptly provide
material to prosecutors even before they are explicitly requested to do

North Carolina’s lead, see, e.g., Reamey, supra note 13, North Carolina’s early adoption of openfile discovery allows for a more in-depth look at the effect it has had, and how the reform has played
out in practice.
132 See Mary K. Tate, Commissioning Innocence and Restoring Confidence: The North Carolina
Innocence Inquiry Commission and the Missing Deliberative Citizen, 64 ME. L. REV. 531, 534
(2012).
133 See Scheck, supra note 3, at viii; Sullivan, supra note 13.
134 See Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation to Establish Nation’s First Commission on
Prosecutorial Conduct, supra note 13.
135 See Open and Shut: North Carolina Strengthens Its Open Discovery Law, supra note 131.
North Carolina’s adoption of the law was spurred by the scandal that erupted over the 1998
conviction of Alan Gell for capital murder when it was later revealed that prosecutors had withheld
several key pieces of exculpatory evidence in the case. See Mosteller, supra note 13, at 264–76.
Gell was exonerated and freed from death row after his retrial in 2004, at which time the influential
North Carolina State Senator Tony Rand gave local prosecutors and defense attorneys an
ultimatum: “[w]ork out an open file discovery bill or the legislature would pass one on its own.”
Id. at 272.
136 See Nafzger, supra note 10, at 349; see also Reamey, supra note 13; Ashley Southall & Jan
Ransom, Once as Pro-Prosecution as Any Red State, New York Makes a Big Shift on Trials, N.Y.
TIMES (May 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/02/nyregion/prosecutors-evidenceturned-over.html [https://perma.cc/Y4J9-H78L].
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so.137 The amendment also expanded the types of materials these agencies
must provide to help ensure that prosecutors are promptly provided with
all relevant information, which they can then pass on to the defense.138
The efficacy of North Carolina’s open-file discovery law is
appositely illustrated by the Duke Lacrosse Scandal itself. Commentators
have pointed out that the scandal played a crucial role in revealing
Nifong’s misconduct and bringing about his disbarment.139 Indeed, the
Disciplinary Hearing Committee that presided over Nifong’s disbarment
proceedings primarily rested its decision upon his failure to comply with
various obligations imposed by the law.140 The most important aspect of
the law—and part of why it played such an outsized role in the case—is
that instead of giving prosecutors sole discretion to assess what evidence
is exculpatory and therefore necessary to turn over to the defense, it
creates a baseline of standard disclosure requiring all material to be
shared so that the parties can determine as much for themselves. 141 The
significance of this cannot be overstated. For instance, prosecutors—not
used to thinking like defense attorneys—may innocently judge something
to not be exculpatory and necessary to disclose, whereas a veteran

137 See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903(c) (West 2018); Open and Shut: North Carolina
Strengthens Its Open Discovery Law, supra note 131. These new obligations were aimed at
incentivizing police and law enforcement to search for and produce all relevant and available
evidence, or risk being charged with a felony if they fail to do so. See Open and Shut: North
Carolina Strengthens Its Open Discovery Law, supra note 131.
138 See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903(a) (West 2018); Open and Shut: North Carolina
Strengthens Its Open Discovery Law, supra note 131.
139 See Kozinski, supra note 8, at xxvii (“[T]hree years after its passage, the law forced
disclosure of evidence that eventually exonerated three Duke lacrosse players who were falsely
accused of rape—and led to the defeat, disbarment and criminal contempt conviction of Durham
District Attorney Mike Nifong.”); Mosteller, supra note 13, at 259–60, 262 (discussing the outsized
role of North Carolina’s open-file discovery law in the events of Duke Lacrosse case and arguing
that “broad . . . disclosure requirement[s] in criminal cases . . . help[] prevent failures of ethical
standards from ever occurring because little opportunity is allowed for misjudging what is
potentially exculpatory evidence”).
140 See Mosteller, supra note 13, at 292–93 (discussing how the open-file discovery law did “the
lion’s share of the work” in the “process that led to the ultimate disclosure of the exculpatory
information and the imposition of serious professional disciplinary sanctions against Nifong”).
141 See Sullivan & Possley, supra note 3, at 921–22 (“The benefit of open file discovery is that
it removes the determination of disclosure from the prosecutor after he evaluates each piece of
evidence or information and tests it against local discovery rules as well as Brady and its progeny.
The process gives substantial measure of assurance to the trial judge and defense lawyer that there
has been a good faith effort to provide the defense with the government’s complete file.”); see also
Mosteller, supra note 13, at 292–93 (pointing out how the open-file discovery law’s “routine
application produced the basis for further [discovery] requests, and its standard requirement of full
disclosure established an expectation of compliance that the trial judge [in the Duke Lacrosse case]
treated as routine”).
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defense attorney might conclude precisely the opposite.142 Moreover,
open-file discovery theoretically helps to spare prosecutors from
situations in which implicit bias might affect their evaluation of potential
Brady evidence, and to temper “the tension between the prosecutor’s dual
role of zealous advocate and minister of justice,” which “peaks in the
context of Brady decisions.”143 As such, by removing from prosecutors
sole discretion over determining whether a piece of evidence is favorable
and therefore necessary to disclose,144 open-file discovery laws like North
Carolina’s help to assuage some of Brady’s flaws that have become
apparent in the years since it was decided145 and to remove the possibility
that prosecutors ever have the chance to commit Brady violations.146
2.

The Innocence Inquiry Commission

In the wake of several other high-profile wrongful convictions, and
as the Duke Lacrosse Scandal was still unfolding, North Carolina became
the first state in the country to pass legislation creating a so-called
Innocence Inquiry Commission, which is empowered with the legal
authority to investigate claims of innocence and refer cases to a panel of
judges able to grant immediate freedom.147 North Carolina’s Commission
is headed by an Executive Director tasked with implementing the
Commission’s “extraordinary procedure to investigate and determine
credible claims of factual innocence,” and is composed of eight voting
members—representative of each of the stakeholders in the criminal
justice system—who are responsible for deciding which of the
commission’s cases to refer for judicial review by a three-judge panel.148
A petitioner claiming innocence is entitled to appointed counsel
throughout the inquiry into their case, and the Commission is vested with
subpoena and other broad powers which it may utilize in conducting its
142 See Mosteller, supra note 13, at 310 (“The beauty of full open-file discovery is obvious as a
remedy for the difficulty of subjective choice in a competitive adversarial environment. It does not
require a prosecutor to make difficult discretionary decisions . . . [d]isclosing all
evidence . . . means that most Brady evidence will be disclosed as part of the routine.”).
143 Medwed, supra note 10, at 1542. For instance, “[h]aving already concluded that the
defendant is likely guilty, a prosecutor might discount the subsequent discovery of exculpatory
information so as to shirk the uncomfortable psychic reality that he may have charged an innocent
person with a crime.” Id. at 1543; see also RIDOLFI ET AL., supra note 97, at 22.
144 See supra note 141.
145 See discussion supra Section I.B.3.
146 See supra note 142.
147 See Tate, supra note 132, at 534; Anne Blythe, City of Durham Settles Long-Running Lawsuit
with Former Duke Lacrosse Players, THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (May 16, 2014, 10:13 PM),
https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article9122669.html
[https://perma.cc/
A826-DLGQ].
148 Tate, supra note 132, at 543–44.
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reviews.149 Since the Commission began its work in 2007, it has received
2314 claims of actual innocence, held eleven hearings, and presided over
the exoneration of ten individuals.150
While the Innocence Inquiry Commission is a crucial step forward
for recognizing, investigating, and remedying the epidemic of wrongful
convictions—which helps relieve some of the burden from the nonprofits
that shoulder the entirety of the work absent such a commission—it does
not present significant potential for introducing greater accountability
into prosecutions.151 Although the Commission may uncover instances of
prosecutorial misconduct during its case-review process,152 this will not
help prevent the misconduct before it occurs. Additionally, while it is
possible that prosecutors at the trial level will tread more carefully now
that all convicted defendants in North Carolina who claim actual
innocence have a statutory right to at least some review of their claim,
this is hardly a foregone conclusion.153 Ultimately, although the
Commission is a trailblazing and crucial step toward remedying wrongful
convictions, a different type of reform that provides more tangible
deterrence for prosecutors is better suited to curb the misconduct that
sometimes leads to these wrongful convictions.
B.
1.

New York
Brady Orders

In 2009, New York State convened a Justice Task Force composed
of prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, legislators, police officials, and
scientists for the stated mission of “eradicat[ing] the systemic and
individual harms caused by wrongful convictions, . . . promot[ing] public
safety by examining the causes of wrongful convictions,
and . . . recommend[ing] reforms to safeguard against any such
convictions in the future.”154 In February 2017, the Task Force issued a
See id. at 544–45.
See THE N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMM’N, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2018), http://
innocencecommission-nc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/2017-annual-report.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/LRC7-P36R].
151 See Barry C. Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units Revisited, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 705, 711–
12 (2017) (discussing how although “[t]here is much to admire in this model[,] . . . there are also
glaring problems: The Commission does not consider or pursue constitutional problems such as
suppressed exculpatory evidence . . . [or] prosecutorial misconduct”).
152 See id.
153 See id.
154 N.Y. STATE JUSTICE TASK FORCE, REPORT ON ATTORNEY RESPONSIBILITY IN CRIMINAL
CASES 1 (2017), http://www.nyjusticetaskforce.com/pdfs/2017JTF-AttorneyDisciplineReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MVC6-5ZK7].
149
150
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report with several recommendations for addressing attorney conduct
issues in criminal cases, including one aimed at confronting the link
between Brady violations and wrongful convictions.155 Specifically, the
Task Force recommended that all New York trial judges issue an order at
the outset of criminal cases notifying and reminding prosecutors of their
obligations under Brady and its progeny.156 Shortly thereafter, Chief
Judge Janet DiFiore adopted the Task Force’s recommendation and
promulgated new rules requiring all judges presiding over criminal cases
in New York to issue these so-called Brady orders.157 Chief Judge
DiFiore’s action was immediately applauded by many as a
groundbreaking step in the right direction toward greater prosecutorial
accountability.158
Although New York’s new rule is so recent that there has been little
time to see how it plays out in practice, it is a reform many commentators
have long called for.159 This is because even though Brady and its
progeny impose important constitutional obligations on prosecutors,
Brady is not self-enforcing. Accordingly, unless a judge has specifically
ordered certain evidence to be disclosed or for Brady to be complied with,
a prosecutor who violates Brady is at no personal risk.160 Federal District
Judge Emmet Sullivan learned this the hard way after presiding over the
155 See id. at 7–8, 12–13. 15–16; see also Scheck, supra note 3, at viii–xi; Janet DiFiore,
Preserving Due Process and Preventing Wrongful Convictions, N.Y.L.J. (May 1, 2017, 12:00 AM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202784735555
[https://perma.cc/NEJ6WTYD].
156 See N.Y. STATE JUSTICE TASK FORCE, supra note 154, at 7–8, 12–13. 15–16; Scheck, supra
note 3, at viii–xi. The Task Force noted that these Brady orders would help to “create a culture of
disclosure, educate inexperienced prosecutors, serve as a reminder for more experienced
prosecutors regarding their disclosure obligations, and ensure that judges have an ability to enforce
compliance with disclosure requirements.” N.Y. STATE JUSTICE TASK FORCE, supra note 154, at
7.
157 See Press Release, N.Y. State Unified Court Sys., Chief Judge DiFiore Announces
Implementation of New Measure Aimed at Enhancing the Delivery of Justice in Criminal Cases,
(Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.nycourts.gov/PRESS/PDFs/PR17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7CYZHDY]. The Brady orders are required to make specific reference as to the types of material
required to be disclosed, including “information that impeaches the credibility of witnesses,
exculpates or reduces the degree of the defense, or mitigates the degree of the defendant’s
culpability or punishment.” Id.
158 See Innocence Project Applauds New York’s Presiding Judges for Landmark Statewide Rule
Ensuring Comprehensive Brady Disclosure, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Nov. 8, 2017), https://
www.innocenceproject.org/innocence-project-brady-disclosure [https://perma.cc/AJK7-XSZN];
Beth Schwartzapfel, New York Courts Say: Hand It Over, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 8, 2017, 4:20
PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/11/08/new-york-courts-say-hand-it-over [https://
perma.cc/6Y3B-HHVF]; Sullivan, supra note 13.
159 See Jones, supra note 96, at 110–113; Kozinski, supra note 8, at xxxiii-xxiv; Scheck, supra
note 3, at vii–viii; Barry Scheck & Nancy Gertner, Combatting Brady Violations with an ‘Ethical
Rule’ Order for the Disclosure of Favorable Evidence, 37 CHAMPION 40 (2013); Sullivan, supra
note 39; Sullivan & Possley, supra note 3, at 929; Sullivan, supra note 13.
160 See Kozinski, supra note 8, at xxxiii–xxxiv.
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botched prosecution of former Senator Ted Stevens in 2008.161 After
Senator Stevens was found guilty of lying on Senate disclosure forms, it
was revealed that federal prosecutors had concealed numerous pieces of
favorable evidence that likely could have helped win his acquittal.162
Judge Sullivan appointed a special prosecutor to investigate this
misconduct, who later concluded that Justice Department lawyers had
“committed deliberate and ‘systematic’ ethical violations by withholding
critical evidence pointing to Stevens’s innocence.”163 Yet, the special
prosecutor also found that Judge Sullivan was powerless to punish the
wrongdoers because he had not directly ordered the prosecution to abide
by their constitutional obligations.164 As a result, Judge Sullivan adopted
a personal practice of issuing Brady orders in each criminal case he
presides over so he can personally hold accountable any prosecutor
appearing before him who willfully flaunts Brady’s requirements.165 As
other commentators have noted, the ability to hold prosecutors personally
responsible like this “will doubtless result in far greater compliance [with
Brady].”166
Much like open-file discovery, the issuance of Brady orders as a
matter of course in criminal cases thus appears to help resolve another
major flaw exposed in Brady in the years since it was handed down. That
is, it finally gives the Brady rule some much-needed teeth for its
enforcement and facilitates prosecutors being held accountable for any
intentional misconduct.167 Even more importantly, the requirement that
the issued Brady orders make specific reference to the types of material
that must be disclosed—such as information that impeaches the
credibility of witnesses168—helps to ensure that all stakeholders involved
in a criminal case are aware of their legal obligations, encourages them
to work together to discharge these duties, and helps to ameliorate the
lack of training at some district attorney’s offices like Connick’s

See Sullivan, supra note 13; see also supra note 39.
See Sullivan, supra note 13; see also supra note 39.
163 Sullivan, supra note 13; see also supra note 39.
164 See Sullivan, supra note 13; see also supra note 39.
165 See Sullivan, supra note 13.
166 Kozinski, supra note 8, at xxxiv.
167 See Scheck & Gertner, supra note 159, at 44 (noting that Brady orders will “both generally
and specifically deter ‘bad apple’ prosecutors because [the order] is not subject to many of the
practical and procedural hurdles that have obstructed punishment even for deliberate, intentional,
and malicious Brady violations. . . . [Brady orders] offer[] a remedy through which the defense bar
can take direct action against individual prosecutors who deserve to be sanctioned in front of the
judge whose order was violated”).
168 See supra notes 156–157.
161
162
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OPDA.169 Moreover, by reserving sanctions only for willful and
deliberate violators of Brady, the order aims to engage judges in routinely
inquiring about problems that arise in the Brady disclosure process and
recording their findings, which should help to both discern broader
systemic issues and identify bad-apple prosecutors who deliberately
flaunt the rules.170 Indeed, although the Brady order reform is an
important step forward, it will ultimately fall to judges to do the lion’s
share of the work in terms of ensuring that compliance with Brady orders
is routinely enforced.171
2.

Prosecutorial Conduct Commission

Following close on the heels of New York’s implementation of the
Brady order rule, Governor Andrew Cuomo on August 20, 2018, signed
a bill into law that created the nation’s first state-wide commission aimed
at addressing prosecutorial misconduct.172 The Commission is modeled
after New York’s successful Commission on Judicial Conduct, and will
be comprised of eleven experienced criminal law practitioners
empowered with investigating complaints about prosecutorial conduct—
or initiating investigations on their own—to determine whether
prosecutors have engaged in unprofessional, unethical, or unlawful

169 See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 96–105 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Scheck,
supra note 3, at ix (noting how “the order serves as the sort of real-time checklist that cognitive
scientists and safety experts recommend” in that it requires “reviewing all the categories of
information required to be disclosed at each court appearance,” thereby “induc[ing] the prosecutor,
the court, and the defense to communicate and make sure critical information is not missed, much
in the way flight crews go through their checklists before an airplane takes off or an Intensive Care
Unit team goes through a checklist in an emergency room”).
170 See Scheck, supra note 3, at xii.
171 See id. (“The best way to ensure that all stakeholders work together to make sure favorable
information is disclosed, and to avoid the intentional suppression of exculpatory evidence that
caused so much damage to so many people in the Michael Morton and Ted Stevens cases, is to
have a court system where a Brady order is fairly and systematically enforced by judges.”).
172 See Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation to Establish Nation’s First Commission on
Prosecutorial Conduct, supra note 13; see also Scheck, supra note 3, at xxv–xxvi (praising New
York’s attempt to create “a multi-stakeholder institution that comprehensively assesses
prosecutorial misconduct as a system issue”); Innocence Project Applauds Gov. Cuomo for
Approving Landmark Legislation to Combat Prosecutorial Misconduct, INNOCENCE PROJECT
(Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.innocenceproject.org/innocence-project-applauds-gov-cuomo-forapproving-landmark-legislation-to-combat-prosecutorial-misconduct
[https://perma.cc/PA24WX5C] (noting that the law will “serve as a model for other states on how to address the lack of
accountability for prosecutorial misconduct that too often results in innocent people being wrongly
convicted for crimes they didn’t commit”).
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conduct.173 The Commission will have broad investigative powers,
including the power to conduct hearings;174 issue subpoenas;175 compel
witnesses to testify;176 demand any documents, records, or materials
deemed necessary for its investigation;177 receive assistance from any
state agency whose cooperation will enable it to carry out its duties;178
and compel prosecutors to testify and turn over documents.179
Additionally, the Commission’s findings, conclusions, and records of its
proceedings must be made publicly available upon the completion of each
of its inquiries.180 Although the Commission will not be able to directly
punish prosecutors it finds to have violated their legal and ethical
obligations, it will have the power to censure them, suggest sanctions
against them, and recommend that the governor remove them if they are
found to have committed intentional misconduct.181
Unsurprisingly, the prospect of the new commission has generated
vehement pushback from New York’s district attorneys, who portray it
as a “flawed” and “unconstitutional” plan that will ultimately do more
harm than good by interfering with the duties of prosecutors and not
bringing any meaningful oversight.182 Specifically, district attorneys
claim that the law (1) violates the separation of powers between the three
branches of New York’s state government; (2) creates due process
concerns by failing to set standards for initiating investigations; (3)
improperly grants broad investigative powers that are not circumscribed
to safeguard against exposing sensitive information related to ongoing
criminal investigations; and (4) unconstitutionally vests appellate
jurisdiction for the Commission’s decisions with New York’s highest
court, the Court of Appeals.183 Governor Cuomo acknowledged these and
173 See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-a (McKinney 2019); Scheck, supra note 3, at xxvi; Jesse
McKinley, A New Panel Can Investigate Prosecutors. They Plan to Sue to Block It., N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/23/nyregion/cuomo-prosecutors-oversightcommission.html [https://perma.cc/L838-SBFE].
174 See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-d(1).
175 See id.
176 See id.
177 See id.
178 See id. § 499-d(3).
179 See id. §§ 499-d(1), f(3).
180 See id. § 499-f(7).
181 See id.
182 See McKinley, supra note 173.
183 See Dan M. Clark, DAs File Constitutional Challenge to NY Prosecutorial Conduct
Commission, N.Y.L.J. (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/10/17/dasfile-constitutional-challenge-to-ny-prosecutorial-conduct-commission
[https://perma.cc/79BQUG6B]; see also CTR. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PUB. INTEGRITY, COLUMBIA LAW SCH., THE
NEW YORK PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT COMMISSION: WHAT COMES NEXT? 2–3 (2018),
https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/public-integrity/prosecutorial_
misconduct_commission.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QAD-465F].
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other concerns when he signed the bill, making his support contingent
upon the legislature amending the law to address these concerns before it
was set to take effect.184 Nonetheless, the District Attorneys Association
of the State of New York (DAASNY) filed suit to halt the Commission’s
implementation,185 to which Governor Cuomo temporarily agreed on
December 7, 2018.186
Shortly after the New York Legislature reconvened in January 2019,
it addressed some of the concerns that had been raised by passing the
chapter amendments Governor Cuomo conditioned his support upon.187
The amendments make a number of changes. First, they address the
separation-of-powers concerns by locating oversight of the Commission
squarely within the executive department, rather than making it a
standalone entity as had originally been envisioned.188 The amendments
also give the governor the power to appoint four members of the
Commission, more appointments than any other individual possesses.189
Second, the amendments set out specific procedures for requesting the
withdrawal or modification of a subpoena issued by the Commission if a
prosecuting agency feels that complying with it will interfere with an
ongoing criminal investigation.190 In the event this happens, a prosecuting
agency must inform the Commission of the basis for its position, after
which time the Commission is restricted from exercising its powers in
See McKinley, supra note 173.
See Clark, supra note 183.
186 See Brendan J. Lyons, Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct Shelved, for Now,
TIMESUNION (Dec. 10, 2018, 3:54 PM), https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/Commissionon-Prosecutorial-Conduct-shelved-for-13455288.php [https://perma.cc/F6TQ-BZEP]. Despite this
agreement, “neither side retreated from their positions: [t]he governor’s office said the law’s
constitutional defects will be repaired through legislative amendments and the commission will be
established; the district attorneys association declared its members will ‘not tolerate
unconstitutional interference’ in their work.” Id.
187 See Dan M. Clark, NY Lawmakers Approve Constitutional Fix to Law Creating
Prosecutorial Watchdog, N.Y.L.J. (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/
2019/01/15/ny-lawmakers-approve-constitutional-fix-to-law-creating-prosecutorial-watchdog
[https://perma.cc/WJJ3-R3TR].
188 Compare N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-a (McKinney 2019) (“There is hereby created within the
executive department a state commission of prosecutorial conduct.”), with N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-a
(McKinney 2018) (“A state commission of prosecutorial conduct is hereby established.”).
189 See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-c(1) (McKinney 2019). The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals
is responsible for three appointments, and the majority and minority leaders in the legislature each
make one of the four remaining appointments. See id. Of the eight combined appointments made
by the governor and the legislature, the law requires that four of these eight appointees be
individuals with at least five years of public defense experience, and the other four be active,
former, or retired prosecutors with at least five years of experience. See id. § 499-c(1)(a), (c). The
amendments also mandate that two of the Chief Judge’s three appointees be retired judges, one
with a public defense background and one with a prosecutorial background, and that the Chief
Judge’s final remaining appointee be an academic with significant criminal law experience. See id.
§ 499-c(1)(b).
190 See id. § 499-d(1).
184
185
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ways that might interfere with the active investigation and prosecution.191
Finally, the amendments vest appellate jurisdiction over the
Commission’s decisions in the Appellate Divisions of the State Supreme
Court—rather than in the Court of Appeals—which can reject, affirm, or
modify the decision at issue.192 This helps bring the Commission’s
workings in line with existing procedures, as each Appellate Division
already houses grievance committees that accept complaints and
recommend sanctions against attorneys.193
Although Governor Cuomo approved the amended version of the
law on March 27, 2019, he did so while expressing continuing concerns
about the perceived separation-of-powers issues raised by the DAASNY
legal challenge.194 Several days later, DAASNY renewed its challenge.195
In June 2019, after Governor Cuomo and other legislative leaders
signaled their intent to assert individual immunity defenses in the
litigation, DAASNY offered to drop them from the suit if they agreed to
halt the Commission’s creation and defer making appointments until the
litigation was resolved.196 DAASNY’s offer was accepted, leaving
Assembly Speaker Carl Heastie as the law’s sole defender in the suit.197
Shortly thereafter, DAASNY moved for summary judgment, largely
reiterating the same arguments they had previously advanced.198
Assembly Speaker Heastie responded with his own cross-motion for
summary judgment, rebuffing DAASNY’s separation-of-powers

191 See id. In such situations, the commission is specifically prohibited from exercising its
powers prior to the earlier of: “(a) the filing of an accusatory instrument with respect to the crime
or crimes that led to such prosecuting agency’s investigation and underlie the complaint [received
by the commission]; or (b) one year from the commencement of the occurrence of the crime or
crimes that led to such prosecuting agency’s investigation and underlie the complaint [received by
the commission].” Id.
192 See id. § 499-f(7).
193 See Clark, supra note 183.
194 See Dan M. Clark, Cuomo, Lawmakers Agree Not to Defend Prosecutorial Watchdog’s
Constitutionality, N.Y. L.J. (June 2, 2019, 2:22 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/
2019/06/02/cuomo-lawmakers-agree-not-to-defend-prosecutorial-watchdogs-constitutionality
[https://perma.cc/C76G-DNMF]; Rachel Silberstein, Cuomo approves changes to Commission on
Prosecutorial Conduct, TIMESUNION (Mar. 27, 2019, 4:20 PM), https://www.timesunion.com/
news/article/Law-amended-for-Prosecutorial-Misconduct-13721324.php [https://perma.cc/GE4HHUKJ].
195 See Verified Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Soares v. New
York, No. 906409-18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 1, 2019), NYSCEF Doc. No. 33.
196 See Clark, supra note 194.
197 See id.
198 See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgement,
Soares v. New York, No. 906409-18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 22, 2019), NYSCEF Doc. No. 76; Dan M.
Clark, NY District Attorneys Formally Move to Strike Down Prosecutorial Watchdog Law, N.Y.
L.J (July 24, 2019, 5:21 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/07/24/ny-districtattorneys-formally-move-to-strike-down-prosecutorial-watchdog-law
[https://perma.cc/Z3DSB2NF].
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concerns. In so doing, he highlighted both the common practice in New
York of creating panels with appointees from different branches of
government and the law’s severability clause, which would allow the law
to stand even if parts of it were invalidated.199 Assembly Speaker Heastie
also rejected DAASNY’s assertion that the Commission’s mere existence
would interfere with prosecutors’ discretion and chill the exercise of their
constitutional function, pointing out that the argument is purely
hypothetical and premature prior to the Commission’s formation and that,
in any event, the panel was merely intended to be an oversight tool to
ensure prosecutors’ compliance with ethical and professional
standards.200 Numerous amici curiae echoed these arguments in a brief
filed in support of Assembly Speaker Heastie’s motion, in which they
noted that DAASNY’s objections to the law appeared more grounded in
its policy preferences than in constitutional law, and argued that the
demonstrated failure of existing oversight mechanisms gave the New
York Legislature ample reason to exercise its authority to regulate
prosecutors.201
Even though the future of the Commission hangs in the balance as
of this writing and its final composition may be subject to modification
pending the outcome of DAASNY’s legal challenge, the strong bipartisan
support that conceived the Commission suggests the idea has staying
power in one form or another.202 The novelty of this commendable effort
warrants comment on the prospective impact such a commission could
have. There is no longer any doubt that the present lack of accountability
for prosecutors—epitomized by Harry Connick’s blasé attitude toward
heeding Brady’s instruction in the face of overturned conviction after
overturned conviction from his office—has played an alarming and
serious role in contributing to many wrongful convictions.203 For this
reason, a prosecutorial conduct commission like the one envisioned by
New York is another reform that, much like the Brady order,

199 See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment & in
Support of Defendant Carl E. Heastie’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 34–55, 66–67,
Soares v. New York, No. 906409-18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 26, 2019), NYSCEF Doc. No. 98; Dan
M. Clark, Attorneys for Assembly Speaker Move to Uphold Prosecutorial Watchdog Panel, N.Y.
L.J. (Aug. 28, 2019, 3:14 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/08/28/attorneysfor-assembly-speaker-move-to-uphold-prosecutorial-watchdog-panel
[https://perma.cc/A2NT823X].
200 See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment & in
Support of Defendant Carl E. Heastie’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 199, at
23–33, 46–47; Clark, supra note 199.
201 See Memorandum of Law of the N.Y. Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Defendant Carl E. Heastie’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Soares v. New
York, No. 906409-18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 3, 2019), NYSCEF Doc. No. 104.
202 See Scheck, supra note 3, at xxvi.
203 See supra Part I.
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commentators have long called for.204 The mere existence of an
independent commission like this, imbued with the sole mandate of
holding prosecutors accountable as well as subpoena power to enforce
that mandate, sends the message that blatant and intentional misconduct
“will not be tolerated by the bar,” which should help to generally “deter
the most blatant types of misconduct.”205 Especially important to this
point is that the findings, conclusions, and records of the Commission’s
proceedings must be made publicly available,206 unlike most state
disciplinary proceedings where “secrecy is the hallmark” and whose
deterrent effect is therefore almost entirely inhibited.207 The
Commission’s deterrent effect will undoubtedly be amplified by the
mandate that the Commission be composed of an equal mix of
experienced practitioners from all sides of the criminal justice system,208
in recognition of the reality that “a system of highly regarded
professionals independent of prosecutors’ offices is essential to a
workable system of [prosecutorial] accountability. Only such a
commission can assume the mantle of authority and engender the respect
necessary to undertake such a task.”209
Another vital design feature of the Commission that must be noted
is its potential for continually spurring transparent criminal justice
reform, even in the absence of any prosecutors being formally censured
or sanctioned.210 This is possible because the Commission’s duties
include issuing annual reports on its proceedings to the governor, the
legislature, and the chief judge of the Court of Appeals, which can include
legislative and administrative recommendations based on problems it has
identified.211 Thus, the law empowers the Commission to root out and
address broader systemic issues impeding greater prosecutorial
204 See Davis, supra note 33, at 463–64; Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier et al., Vigilante Justice:
Prosecutorial Misconduct in Capital Cases, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1327, 1370–71 (2009); Medwed,
supra note 10, at 1549–50; Sullivan & Possley, supra note 3, at 933; Yaroshefsky, supra note 106,
at 296–99; Gershman, supra note 30.
205 Medwed, supra note 10, at 1550 (noting also that “[e]xternal regulation has a profoundly
positive effect on attorney behavior generally. There is no reason to doubt that more vigorous (and
rigorous) supervision of prosecutors by regulatory bodies could achieve similarly constructive
results”).
206 See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(7) (McKinney 2019).
207 Yaroshefsky, supra note 106, at 297 (emphasizing that “[i]f discipline is to serve as a
deterrent to prosecutorial misconduct, the process and its results cannot be secret”).
208 See supra note 189.
209 Yaroshefsky, supra note 106, at 297. The requirement that the commission be composed of
experienced criminal law practitioners is particularly important, given that, for instance, those not
familiar with Brady and its progeny might misapply it, as initially occurred in the disciplinary
proceedings of former OPDA prosecutor Roger Jordan. See In re Jordan, 913 So. 2d 775, 780, 782
(La. 2005).
210 See Scheck, supra note 3, at xxvii.
211 See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-d(4).
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accountability, regardless of whether it finds the need to sanction any
individual prosecutor that comes before it.212 In light of this, the
Commission appears more poised than any of the other individual
reforms touched upon in this Note to usher in a new era of prosecutorial
accountability once it (hopefully) is formed.213 And even if New York’s
commission should never ultimately come to fruition, its model can
nonetheless serve as a prescient blueprint for other states to follow in this
ongoing era of criminal justice reform.
III. PROPOSAL: NEW YORK’S REFORMS ARE THE WAY FORWARD
Although there is much to laud about North Carolina’s
establishment of open-file discovery and its Innocence Inquiry
Commission, neither of these reforms have the potential on their own or
together to provide the kind of accountability and deterrence needed to
curb the ongoing problem of prosecutorial misconduct.214 Even the more
promising of the two reforms—open-file discovery—has its own issues.
While it looks quite promising on paper, commentators have pointed out
that open-file discovery is far messier in practice, given (1) the extra
burdens it saddles on already-overwhelmed public defenders, (2) the
potential that prosecutors might weaponize the process to overwhelm the
defense with documents in order to purposefully frustrate their efforts,
and (3) the prospect that prosecutors may still choose to provide less than
their whole file but nonetheless claim it is complete.215 Thus, even though
open-file discovery is an absolutely crucial step forward to assuage
Brady’s flawed delegation to prosecutors of the sole authority to
determine what evidence is favorable to the defense and is thus necessary
to disclose, it neither inherently provides any tangible deterrence to
prevent intentional misconduct nor creates concrete mechanisms to hold
to task those prosecutors who transgress.
By contrast, New York’s two recent reforms appear to present the
blueprint that all states should begin to follow. The key aspect of both
reforms is that they each provide some of the teeth that the Brady rule has
212 See Scheck, supra note 3, at xxvii (noting how “[i]n many ways, this feature is the
commission’s saving grace in terms of a systems-wide, all stakeholders approach to transparent
criminal justice reform, as it allows for the commission’s proceedings to continually spur system
reform”).
213 See Scheck, supra note 3, at xxv–xxvii; Maura Ewing, New York’s Prosecutorial Misconduct
Review Panel Could Be Groundbreaking, SLATE (Aug. 28, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://slate.com/newsand-politics/2018/08/new-yorks-prosecutorial-misconduct-review-panel-could-begroundbreaking.html [https://perma.cc/YT2X-UZG3].
214 See Brian P. Fox, An Argument Against Open-File Discovery in Criminal Cases, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 425 (2013); Scheck, supra note 151, at 711–12.
215 See Fox, supra note 214, at 427–28.
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long lacked as well as the deterrence necessary to weed out wrong-doing
prosecutors.216 That is, each reform implements mechanisms that will
finally allow for prosecutors to be held to account for their intentional
law-breaking when it occurs.217 Brady orders do this by ensuring that,
from the outset of each criminal case, the prosecutors are aware of their
legal obligations and thus can be sanctioned if they are found to have
deliberately disregarded them.218 And New York’s Prosecutorial Conduct
Commission does this by sending the message loud and clear to
prosecutors that they can and will be investigated, subpoenaed, and
potentially removed from office should they choose to flagrantly
disregard their duties.219
Moreover, each of these reforms creates crucial mechanisms that
will help all stakeholders in the criminal justice system identify error,
investigate root causes, and learn from the mistakes that cause tragic
failures like wrongful convictions.220 Brady orders, by their very nature,
require judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers to routinely ensure that
all information constitutionally required to be disclosed in a criminal case
has been so disclosed, and they induce judges to discover what went
wrong when mishaps do occur so that only deliberate violators are
sanctioned.221 And the Prosecutorial Conduct Commission is vitally
focused not just on investigating and potentially punishing deliberate rule
breakers but also on identifying broader systemic issues in the criminal
justice system and using information gleaned from its investigations to
make recommendations about how these problems might be best
addressed.222
Had a commission such as New York’s existed in Louisiana during
Harry Connick’s tenure as head of OPDA, one can only imagine how
things might have turned out differently. For example, it seems certain
based on the extent of the misconduct emanating from his office that
numerous complaints would have been made to such a hypothetical
commission throughout Connick’s incumbency.223 Upon investigating
and discovering the state of affairs at OPDA that has been laid bare as of
See discussion supra Sections II.B.1, II.B.2.
See discussion supra Sections II.B.1, II.B.2.
218 See discussion supra Section II.B.1. Judge Sullivan has found that issuing a detailed standing
Brady order in each criminal case he presides over helps to “remind[] the prosecutors who appear
before me exactly what is required of them, and . . . ensure[] that any who intentionally withhold
evidence can be held accountable.” Sullivan, supra note 13. Judge Sullivan has also advocated for
amending the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to include a Brady order-like requirement. See
Sullivan, supra note 39.
219 See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
220 See Scheck, supra note 3, at iii–v.
221 See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
222 See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
223 See supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text.
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217
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late,224 the commission undoubtedly would have censured or
recommended the removal of OPDA prosecutors like Gerry Deegan, who
admitted to intentionally suppressing the blood swatch evidence in John
Thompson’s case.225 Seeing fellow prosecutors around them being
punished or removed for violating Brady would have likely, in turn,
prompted other prosecutors in the office to take their Brady obligations
much more seriously.226 One would also expect that the repeated pattern
of flagrant Brady violations coming out of Connick’s office would
eventually have caused the commission to become as consternated about
OPDA and Connick’s leadership of it as the Louisiana State Court of
Appeal, Fourth Circuit, was when it wrote that it was “not unmindful of
the storied, shameful history of the local prosecuting authorities’
noncompliance with Brady.”227 Sooner or later, the commission likely
would have looked into Connick himself, possibly leading to his removal
from office or, at the very least, his realization that properly training his
prosecutors to comply with Brady would help stave off the commission’s
inquiries and make his job easier. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a world
where, with such a commission in Louisiana, Connick could have
remained as unconcerned about complying with the law as he did in the
face of mounting investigations and the public airing of his office’s
malfeasance.
CONCLUSION
While most prosecutors are ethically scrupulous and law-abiding in
their pursuit of justice,228 the present state of affairs makes clear that those
prosecutors who do choose to cross the line face zero consequences.229
This is true even after their sometimes willful misconduct is exposed and
the innocent people they put in prison—or on death row—have been
freed.230 Although the number of prosecutors who engage in intentional
misconduct may be comparatively small, the consequences are outsized,
as any of the fifty-four percent of exonerees whose wrongful convictions
have involved official misconduct can attest.231 Prosecutors, as

See supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
226 See, e.g., Medwed, supra note 10, at 1549–50.
227 State v. Wells, 191 So. 3d 1127, 1139 (La. Ct. App. 2016) (citations omitted); see also supra
notes 67–71 and accompanying text.
228 See Kozinski, supra note 8, at xxvi; Yaroshefsky, supra note 106, at 294.
229 See supra text accompanying notes 12, 96–128.
230 See supra text accompanying notes 12, 96–128.
231 See % of Exonerations by Contributing Factor, supra note 10; see also Official Misconduct,
supra note 10.
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“minister[s] of justice,”232 have just as much of a duty as the courts to
ensure that criminal defendants receive fair trials.233 Yet, when
overzealous, undertrained, or unethical prosecutors flagrantly disregard
this duty and face no resulting consequences, their actions grievously
harm not only John Thompson and the many other innocent people like
him, but also serve to undermine public confidence in the fairness and
integrity of our justice system as a whole. If doing justice is to mean
anything in this country, we must fix this. New York’s reforms are a
much-needed step in the right direction.
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